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In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk 
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1 Introduction
Individuals who seek insurance di¤er from each other in many respects. At
least two of these di¤erences are of central importance for insurance compa-
nies and for insurance market outcomes: the distribution of losses that insur-
ance takers face, and their willingness to bear the risk of those losses.1 Em-
pirically, heterogeneity in the second characteristic is not negligible. Aarbu
and Schroyen (2011), for example, nd that the degree of relative risk aver-
sion among Norwegians averages above four with a standard deviation of
about three.
Insurance market theory has primarily focussed on the consequences of
private information on the loss distribution, and to a lesser extent on the
case in which information on risk aversion is private, but has rarely stud-
ied situations in which private information applies to both characteristics.2
Moreover, analysis of the two-dimensional private-information problem has
been restricted to competitive markets; i.e., a setting in which several in-
surers compete for clients. In this paper, we study the opposite setting by
asking how a monopolist would design a contract menu intended to attract
agents who hold not only private information on their loss distribution, but
also on their risk preferences.
Adding risk aversion heterogeneity to the analysis of insurance markets
calls for a multidimensional hidden information model. Such an analysis is
technically not straightforward, because the existence of private information
in two or more dimensions implies that the ordering of agents according to
their willingness to pay for extra coverage becomes endogenous. In other
words, the ordering depends on the contract. To see this, consider two
contracts: one with very partial coverage and one with almost full coverage.
When o¤ered the former contract, a highly risk-averse agent facing a low risk
may be more willing to pay for additional coverage than a risk-tolerant agent
facing a high risk, while the situation could be the other way around for the
latter contract. Technically, the indi¤erence curves of these intermediate
1A third factor, that will not be discussed here, is the moral stance of insurees, deter-
mining the amount of false claims that insurers have to deal with each year.
2Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyse a perfectly competitive insurance market with
private information on the distribution of losses. Stiglitz (1977, Sections 3 and 4), and
Landsberger and Meilijson (1996) analyse a monopolist insurer. Stiglitz (1977, Section 5)
and Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) analyse the outcomes under monopoly when private
information is held on risk attitude.
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insurance takers cross twice, and this invalidates standard solution methods.3
There is a scant literature on solutions to multidimensional screening
problems. One branch of this literature is methodological and deals with a
principalagent setting, as we do see, e.g., the users guideby Armstrong
and Rochet (1999). It turns out, however, that our insurance problem does
not lend itself to being solved by the techniques proposed therein, the main
reason being that our problem has two hidden characteristics, but only one
instrument the degree of coverage.4 A second branch of literature deals
with multidimensional screening in insurance markets, but restricts itself to
competitive markets. In this literature, it is usually assumed that each
insurance company o¤ers a single contract.5 In a monopolistic setting such
as ours, such a restriction would render the analysis trivial and unrealistic.
By assuming that the monopolist o¤ers a menu of contracts, the relative
proportion of the non-intermediate types play a role that is as crucial as
the non-single crossing of intermediate typesindi¤erence curves. Hence, the
problem of the failure of the single crossing condition brought about by
the intermediate types is compounded in the monopolistic setting by the
necessity of dealing with non-intermediate types in the design of the optimal
menu of contracts.
Our main objective is to characterize this optimal menu. We establish
3Jullien et al. (2007) analyse whether the single crossing property holds in the general
monopolistic screening model with moral hazard and in which agents di¤er in their risk
preferences. For more information on the role of this property in a competitive insurance
market with the same informational assumptions and moral hazard, see De Donder and
Hindriks (2009).
4Armstrong and Rochet (1999) study a problem in which the agent has quasilinear
and separable preferences on two action levels and a transfer. The principal has similar
preferences but she is unsure whether the agent has a high or low valuation for either
of the two activities. A contract species a transfer and two activity levels. In our
problem, there is only one activity, i.e., insurance coverage. An agents willingness to
pay for coverage depends on both her risk level and risk aversion. On the other hand, the
insurers willingness to o¤er coverage depends on the level of risk, but not on the agents
risk aversion. Risk aversion only indirectly determines contract protability through the
rents that must be left for incentive compatibility reasons. To sum up, we have a screening
problem with two hidden characteristics, one of which is a common value, and with one
instrument. This also makes our problem di¤erent from those of Armstrong (1999) (who
incorporates one instrument and two common value characteristics) and Dana (1993) (two
instruments, two common value characteristics).
5This de facto means that the main results are driven by the lack of order between
what we refer to as intermediate types; namely, by those whose indi¤erence curves cross
twice. This explains why some authors only consider these intermediate types see, e.g.,
Wambach (2000). Although Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) consider the full set of
types, they maintain the assumption that each company o¤ers a single contract.
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three results: (i) it is always optimal to pool some of the types (i.e., full
separation of types is never optimal); (ii) unlike in the one-dimensional case,
exclusion of some high-risk individuals from insurance may be optimal; and
(iii) some low-risk individuals may end up with more coverage than some
high-risk individuals.
Next, we address two issues that have received much recent attention.
The rst one is methodological. In testing for the presence of asymmetric
information in insurance markets, the question is whether the absence of sig-
nicant positive correlation between risk and coverage (i.e., the absence of
adverse selection) should be taken as indicative of the absence of asymmetric
information. Chiappori et al. (2006) derive the testable prediction that in a
su¢ ciently competitive insurance market with asymmetric information, the
observable risk should be related to coverage in a positively monotonic way.
Notice that this is stronger than requiring a positive correlation between cov-
erage and risk. We show when this result goes through in our monopolistic
setting, and when it does not. In the latter case, we also show when risk and
coverage can be statistically positively correlated, and when they cannot. In
this sense, our results corroborate the role of the su¢ cient competition as-
sumption for the Chiappori et al. (2006) result. Our analysis also adds to the
list of possible explanations for the lack of evidence supporting the existence
of asymmetric information the combination of market power and preference
heterogeneity.6 Other explanations in the (growing) list are: (i) endogenous
heterogeneity in risks because of moral hazard (see, e.g., Cutler et al., 2008);
(ii) endogenous wealth heterogeneity (Netzer and Scheuer, 2007); and (iii)
the insurer having privileged information on risks (Villeneuve, 2000).
The second issue concerns the possible welfare consequences of the ban
on the use of gender discrimination in insurance that will take e¤ect from
December 2012 in the European Union. This ban extends the principle of
equal treatment of women and men in the access to and the supply of goods
and services to the insurance industry.7 ;8 This will surely a¤ect the insurance
6Chiappori et al. (2006) propose a local argument for a negative correlation between
risk and coverage to arise in the case of monopoly. Our analysis provides instead a full
characterization.
7Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services
(O¢ cial Journal of the European Union 2004 L 373, p. 37)
8The gender directive of 2004 did provide for a derogation that allowed member states
to permit gender-specic di¤erences in insurance premiums and benets in so far as gender
is a determining risk factor that can be substantiated by relevant and accurate actuarial
and statistical data. In March 2011, however, the European Court of Justice declared
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sector, because of the common practice of di¤erentiating premia according to
gender when underwriting life, health and car accident risks. Regarding life
insurance, it has been argued that if one controls for lifestyle, environmental
factors, and social class, the di¤erence in average life expectancy between
men and women lies between zero and two years and therefore that the
practice of insurers to use sex as a determining factor in the evaluation of
risk is based on ease of use rather than on real value as a guide to life
expectancy. (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 6) Not
surprisingly, European insurer carriers have reacted ercely to the proposed
ban, arguing that removing gender would weaken their ability to assess risk
and that gender-neutral calculation would increase the premia for many of
their products, especially for women (Financial Times, November 3, 2003,
p. 2). We show that even if as the Commission claims gender does not
provide any information on the underlying risk, if it does provide (imperfect)
information on an individuals risk aversion (as empirical research suggests),
then allowing the monopolist to condition the terms of the insurance contract
on gender may be Pareto improving. We provide su¢ cient conditions for
such an improvement to arise.
From a technical point of view, we have taken a new approach to the
analysis of screening insurance takers that simplies the problem and is ap-
pealing from a modelling point of view. Rather than following the standard
set-up in which the individual faces the possibility of a single monetary loss,
we assume that the loss is normally distributed and that agents di¤er in their
expected losses, which can be high or low. If the insurance indemnity is lin-
ear in the loss, as is the case under a reimbursement insurance scheme with a
constant co-insurance rate, the nal income will also be normally distributed.
Endowing agents with a utility function that displays constant absolute risk
aversion, which also can be high or low, means that their preferences over
uncertain income prospects can be represented as meanvariance preferences.
An important consequence of this approach is that preferences over insurance
contracts become quasilinear in the insurance premium and therefore in the
information rent. Readers familiar with contract theory will acknowledge
the usefulness of linearity in the information rent in specifying the incentive
compatibility constraints. An additional advantage of meanvariance pref-
this derogating provision in the Directive to be invalid on the grounds that the use of risk
factors based on sex in connection with insurance premiums and benets is incompatible
with the principle of equal treatment for men and women under European Union Law
(European Court of Justice, 2011).
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erences is that they allow for an explicit characterization of the optimal menu
of contracts.
The limitations of our approach follow immediately from these assump-
tions. We do not consider insurance contracts with either a deductible or a
cap because such features would destroy the normality of net income. Sec-
ond, the normality assumption implies a positive likelihood of negative losses,
although this problem may be rendered of secondary importance by consid-
ering su¢ ciently high means and/or low variances for the losses. Perhaps
the most important objection is that we have no skewness in the loss dis-
tribution, and in particular no strictly positive probability mass for a zero
loss. Nevertheless, these are minor limitations when compared with the
considerable advantages the approach o¤ers for characterizing the solution
to a two-dimensional screening problem. To economize on space, our general
characterization is restricted to a non-positive correlation between risk size
and risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we model
the preferences of insurance takers and specify reimbursement contracts. In
Section 3, we set up the problem faced by a monopolistic insurer. In Section
4, we characterize the optimal menu of contracts when insurees only di¤er in
risk levels or risk aversion, as well as considering the case of perfect positive
correlation. In Section 5, we assume that insurees di¤er in both respects
simultaneously and discuss the ve regimes (for contract menus) that may
be optimal. For each regime, we characterize the optimal set of co-insurance
rates. In Section 6, we determine which regime is dominating for which part
of the parameter space. In Section 7, we interpret the testable prediction of
Chiappori et al. (2006) in the light of our results. In Section 8, we trace out
the consequences of allowing the monopolistic insurer to gender discriminate.
Section 9 concludes the paper.
Except when otherwise stated, we have relegated all proofs of lemmas,
theorems and propositions to our companion paper (Olivella and Schroyen,
2011).
2 Insurance takers and reimbursement con-
tracts
Insurance takers
We assume that individuals are endowed with initial wealth e and a nega-
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tive exponential von NeumannMorgenstern utility function dened on nal
wealth y: u(y) =   exp( ry), where r > 0 is the (constant) degree of ab-
solute risk aversion. Initial wealth is subject to a random loss z that follows
a normal distribution with mean  and variance 2.
Agents have access to reimbursement insurance. A typical reimbursement
contract pays out a compensation of 1   c per Euro loss, in return for a
premium P . Ex post, nal wealth is then given by
y = e  P   cz; (1)
which ex ante is also normally distributed. We will express a contract C as
a pair of a co-insurance rate c and a premium P : C = (c; P ).
It is well known that under the assumptions made, the expected utility of
the agent is representable by the certainty equivalent (CE) wealth function
U =E(y)  r
2
var(y). By replacing the mean and variance of nal wealth, CE
wealth is given by
U = e  P   c  r
2
c22. (2)
From now on, we write  def= r2, and assume that this product can be
either high or low, and likewise for the expected loss:  2 fL; Hg and
 2 fL; Hg,where L < H and L < H . The model can thus be inter-
preted in two ways: either individuals are equally risk averse but their losses
have di¤erent variances, or the loss variance is identical but individuals have
di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. Throughout, we adhere to the second
interpretation and will refer to  as risk aversion.
A person with characteristics (i; j) is said to be of type ij. The share
of ij individuals in the population is given by ij (i; j = H;L,
P
i;jij = 1).
We denote by k the fraction of individuals with expected loss k (k =
kL + kH); likewise, k is the fraction of individuals with risk aversion k
(k = Lk + Hk).
Incentive compatible contracts
When a person of type ij (i; j 2 fH;Lg) signs the contract C = (c; P ),
her CE wealth, is
U ij(c; P )
def
= e  P   ci   1
2
c2j. (3)
If instead she decides to remain uninsured, her CE wealth becomes e i 12j,
which is of course equivalent to accepting the contract (c; P ) = (1; 0), under
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which the agent bears the full loss but pays no premium. The CE rent that
the agent enjoys from contract (c; P ) is then
Rij(c; P )
def
= U ij(c; P )  U ij(1; 0) =  P + (1  c)i + 1
2
[1  c2]j. (4)
Hence, the rent decreases with the co-insurance rate both via the expected
loss and via risk aversion (if c > 0).
The marginal willingness to pay for a slightly lower co-insurance rate c is
MWP ij(c)
def
=  dP
dc
jdU ij=0 = i + cj, (5)
which increases linearly in c.
Indi¤erence curves in the contract space (c; P ) are thus concave in c,
and downward sloping for non-negative co-insurance rates. In addition,
individuals with higher expected losses and/or greater risk aversion have a
higher marginal willingness to pay. Figure 1 illustrates the indi¤erence curve
that passes through the no-insurance point N = (1; 0). Given that the slope
of the indi¤erence curve when it passes the P -axis is , it is easy to decompose
the total willingness to pay for full insurance into the expected loss and the
risk premium =2.
Figure 1 here
When agent ij signs a contract intended for agent kl, the rent that the
former receives is given by
Rij(ckl; Pkl) =  Pkl + (1  ckl)i + 1
2
(1  c2kl)j. (6)
It is useful to dene the following function:
(ckl; i   k; j   l) def= (1  ckl)(i   k) + 1
2
(1  c2kl)(j   l). (7)
Suppose now that type kl is truthful and receives rentRkl(ckl; Pkl). Which
rent does ij obtain when choosing the contract for kl? Using (4) and (7),
the answer is given by
Rij(ckl; Pkl)
def
= Rkl(ckl; Pkl) + (ckl; i   k; j   l). (8)
Thus, by pretending to be type kl, type ij can obtain type kls rent plus .
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To see the usefulness of contract distortion, let us x the rent that a
truthful type kl receives under the contract (ckl; Pkl). A marginal increase in
the co-insurance rate for kl, dckl > 0, would have to be compensated by a
marginal decrease in the premium Pkl. This has the following e¤ect on the
rent for the mimicker ij:
@Rij(ckl; Pkl)
@ckl
jdRkl=0 =
@
@ckl
(ckl; i k; j   l) =   (i   k)  ckl(j   l).
Thus, the rent for ij goes down to the extent that: (i) ij is mimicking a type
with a lower risk; and (ii) ij is mimicking a type with lower risk aversion.
The intuition is the following. When raising the co-payment of a low risk (or
risk-tolerant) individual, the decrease in the premium needed to compensate
him is not too large, because of the small likelihood of needing that co-
payment (or because of the low valuation of the increase in the variance
of nal wealth). However, a person with a higher risk level or greater
risk aversion who is tempted by this contract will dislike this change. This
explains why increasing a co-insurance rate for some types will lower the
rents of all those mimicking (and the mimickers of these mimickers) who
have a higher risk, and will increase the rent of all those mimicking (and the
mimickers of these mimickers) who have lower risk aversion.
From now on, we simply write Rij for Rij(cij; Pij) (i; j = L;H). Self-
selection between contracts (cij; Pij) and (ckl; Pkl) then requires that
Rij  Rkl + (ckl; i   k; j   l);
Rkl  Rij + (cij; k   i; l   j);
which, taken together, imply 0  (ckl; i k; j l)+(cij; k i; l j),
or, using (7), Z cij
ckl
[(i   k) + c(j   l)]dc  0.
A necessary condition for incentive compatibility between contracts Hj
and Lj (j = H;L) is thatZ cHj
cLj
dc  0() cHj  cLj; (9)
with  def= H   L > 0. Similarly, incentive compatibility between con-
tracts iH and iL (i = H;L) requires thatZ ciH
ciL
cdc  0() ciH  ciL; (10)
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with  def= H   L and where it is assumed that c  0 (on which more
below).
The double dimensionality leads in general to double crossing of the indif-
ference curves of types HL and LH. SolvingMWPHL(c) =MWPLH(c) for
c yields c = 

. That is, in the (c; P ) space, the locus of tangency points be-
tween HLs and LHs indi¤erence curves is a vertical line at 

. For lower
co-insurance rates, HLs indi¤erence curve crosses that of LH downwards
from above, while for higher rates, this happens from below. The quadratic
expressions for CE wealth ensure that if a crossing occurs at a rate c  to the
left of 

, then the second crossing occurs at c+, at the same distance to the
right of 

 see Figure 2. Hence, if we say that the indi¤erence curves of
HL and LH form a lens, then c
++c 
2
= 

is the position of this lens, while
`
def
= c+   c  is its size.9
Figure 2 here
Next, we introduce two crucial variables for characterizing the prot max-
imizing set of contracts, as follows:
D
def
=

L
2 (0;1) and x def= L
H
2 (0; 1]:
The ratio D measures, in a unit-free fashion, the di¤erence in risk between
two types.10 The ratio x measures the degree of similarity along the risk-
aversion dimension. Using this notation, the locus of tangency points is
therefore located at D x
1 x , so that for su¢ ciently small x, the tangency of
the intermediate typesindi¤erence occurs at a co-insurance rate below unity.
This makes it possible that both crossings become relevant for the analysis.
9The right- (left-) crossing co-insurance rate is given by c+(c ) =  +
( )
r


2
+ 2U
HL ULH
 , where U
HL(ULH) is the CE wealth for HL(LH). Hence,
the size of the lens, dened as c+   c , is ` = 2
r


2
+ 2U
HL ULH
 , a dimensionless
number.
10Because the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (r) measures twice the risk premium
per unit of variance, we can conclude that the risk premium of a low-risk-averse type
(RPL, say) equals 12L. Therefore, D =

2RPL
= 12
=L
RPL=L
.
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3 The insurance company
We consider a single, risk-neutral insurer with monopoly power on the market
for reimbursement contracts. Her expected prots when an agent of type ij
has accepted a reimbursement contract (c; P ) is given by
ij(c; P ) = P   i = P   (1  c)i. (11)
Therefore, the iso-prot associated with type ij has slope  i in the contract
space (c; P ).
With full information, the monopolist will provide ij with full insurance
(cij = 0) at a premium that sets her rent equal to zero. Hence, using (4),
Pij = i +
1
2
j. This yields a per capita payo¤ equal to  = 12j. The
tangency line in Figure 1 thus corresponds to the highest feasible iso-prot
line, and the prot that the insurer makes can be read o¤ from the dashed
vertical axis on the right- hand side. Under full information, the insurer can
extract the entire risk premium =2. In what follows, we will characterize
the optimal co-insurance rates and the optimal rents. The corresponding
premia can then be found with the help of (4).
Given (11), the insurers total prot is equal to
P
i;j ij
ij(cij; Pij). From
(4) and (11) both evaluated at (cij; Pij)and recalling that we can write
Rij for Rij(cij; Pij) (i.e., type ijs rent when truthful), we can express the
insurers total prot as X
i;j
ij

1
2
[1  c2ij]j  Rij

. (12)
This objective function is to be maximized with respect to (cij; Rij) (ij =
H;L), subject to the usual voluntary participation and incentive compatibil-
ity constraints.
As in most of the literature, to these constraints we add two additional
sets of constraints that are needed to avoid false claims (see, e.g., Picard,
2000). If a co-insurance rate is negative, the insurer refunds more than
100% of the losses, and the insuree will obviously have a strong incentive
to overstate the size of the loss. On the other hand, if a co-insurance rate
exceeds unity, the agent will have to be paid to accept such a contract (i.e.,
a negative premium). Once the agent has accepted the insurance, he would
have to pay the insurer as well as bearing the loss once it occurs. It is clear
that he would have strong incentives to understate the size of the loss (or
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even hide the loss altogether). Hence, we constrain co-insurance rates to lie
in the interval [0; 1].
The monopolist thus solves the following problem:
max
fcij ;Rijg
X
i;j
ij

1
2
[1  c2ij]j  Rij

, s.t. (13)
Rij  0 (i; j;= H;L) (14)
Rij  Rkl + (ckl; i   k; j   l) (i; j; k; l;= H;L) (15)
0  cij  1 (i; j;= H;L) (16)
The rst set of constraints ensures voluntary participation, while the sec-
ond ensures that all types self-select. The third set comprises the (reduced
form) ex ante and ex post moral hazard constraints.
The following theorem provides the usual result of no-distortion-at-the-
top (full insurance for the HH type) and no-rents-at-the-bottom. Except
when otherwise stated, all proofs are relegated to our companion paper
(Olivella and Schroyen, 2011).
Theorem 1 At the optimum solution,(i) cHH = 0 and (ii) RLL = 0.
Before characterizing the rest of the solution to the two-dimensional
screening problem, it is useful to rst consider the one-dimensional case.
4 One-dimensional screening
There are three instances in which screening becomes unidimensional. In the
rst instance, all agents have the same risk aversion; i.e., H = L = . This
is the standard monopoly problem with just two types when insurees either
bear a low or a high expected loss. The type distribution can be described
by a single parameter H, the proportion of high risks in the population.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 When all agents have the same risk aversion, the optimal menu
has cH = 0 and cL = minfD H1 H ; 1g.
The full insurance contract giving L zero rent would be selected by H
as well. At a zero co-insurance rate, the slope of Hs indi¤erence curve is
steeper than that of L. If the insurer increases cL above zero, this will
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create a second-order reduction in prot from L, but a rst-order gain in
prot from H because the latter can be charged a strictly higher premium
(for full insurance). Hence, it pays to start distorting Ls contract. The
optimal co-insurance rate balances the gain in prot from H (H ) with
the loss in prots from L ((1   H)). Notice that it may pay to exclude
type L whenever H  1=(1 +D); i.e., whenever the proportion of low loss
agents is su¢ ciently small as expected.
The second instance in which the screening problem becomes unidimen-
sional is when individuals di¤er in risk aversion only. Let H instead be the
proportion of highly risk-averse types; i.e., those with  = H(> L). We
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When all agents face the same expected loss, the optimal menu
has cH = 0; and cL =

0 if x > H
1 otherwise.
This result is less standard. With only di¤erences in risk aversion, the
optimal solution is always at the corner. Either the low type is excluded or
he receives full insurance. The reason for this bang-bangsolution is that,
unlike in the di¤erent risk scenario, at a zero co-insurance rate, both Hs
and Ls indi¤erence curves are tangential to one another. Hence, distorting
Ls contract by raising the co-insurance rate now results in a second-order
gain in prot from H, and it is the second-order condition that determines
whether cL = 0 is a local maximum or minimum.
The nal instance of unidimensional screening arises when risk levels and
risk aversion are perfectly positively correlated. As it transpires from (5),
we have MWPHH(c) > MWPLL(c) for any c. The two types are therefore
once again unambiguously ordered.
Theorem 4 When the two characteristics are perfectly positively correlated,
the optimal menu has cHH = 0 and cLL =
minfD HHx
x HH ;1g if x > HH
1 otherwise.
:
We now turn to the two-dimensional screening problem.
5 Two-dimensional screening
From now on, we let individuals not only di¤er in their risk levels, but also in
their risk aversion. The insurance company then faces the following bivariate
probability distribution of types:
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L H
L LL LH L
H HL HH H
L H 1
The correlation between risk () and risk aversion () plays an important
role in the analysis. This is given by
corr(; ) =
E(  E)(   E)

=
HHLL   LHHLp
LH
p
LH
:
In what follows, we let  represent the numerator of the correlation expres-
sion: viz.,  def= HHLL   LHHL.
To parameterize the distribution of types, we use the triplet (H; HH ; ),
and have the remaining fractions determined by
HL = H   HH ; (17)
LH = HH
1  H
H
  
H
, and (18)
LL = (H   HH)1  H
H
+

H
. (19)
Non-negativity of LH and LL requires that  HL(1 H)    HH(1 
H). The feasible set of distribution parameters is then
A0 =

(H; HH ; ) 2 [0; 1]2 R j HH  H
and   (H   HH)(1  H)    HH(1  H)g :
The other parameters of the model,D and x, pertain to the characteristics
of the insurance takers. This part of the parameter space is denoted as the
types set T0:
T0 = f(D; x) 2 R+  (0; 1)g:
It turns out that D and x are su¢ cient to describe the problem we can
discard the original parameters i and j (i; j = H;L).11
In our analysis, we focus on the case in which the correlation of character-
istics is non-positive (  0). Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant
situation: highly risk-averse individuals tend to take more precautions and
11The fact that four parameters can be reduced to two follows from the fact that we
can normalize L to unity, and because, in the monopolist problem only,  matters see
(15).
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are thereby less likely to experience losses. Our model could be seen as
a reduced form of a more general model in which individuals have initially
taken such precautions before going to the insurance market. Second, there
is a pragmatic reason for this restriction: under negative correlation, the
typology of the equilibrium set of contracts is already complex, but mostly
invariant to the degree of negative correlation. By contrast, with positive
correlation, the degree of correlation starts to matter for characterizing the
optimal contract menus in the parameter space. Thus, we restrict the set of
distribution parameters to
A1 = f(H; HH ; ) 2 A0 and   0g:
The monotonicity conditions (9) and (10) imply that there are only two
possible orderings of co-insurance rates, as follows:
Order 1: 0 = cHH  cHL  cLH  cLL  1; (20)
Order 2: 0 = cHH  cLH  cHL  cLL  1: (21)
Lemma 1 If Order 1 applies with cHH < cLH , it is optimal to pool HL with
HH if and only if x > HH
H
.
This result is intuitive. With Order 1, the only type that may envy
the contract for HL is HH. Thus, the choice of cHL is only governed by
weighing the prots from these two types. Because they have the same risk
levels, we can apply Theorem 3 to this subgroup. Given that the fraction of
highly risk-averse individuals in this group is HH
H
, the result follows.
In our technical companion paper, we show that no more than ve regimes
solve the monopolists problem. By a regime, we mean a menu of contracts
satisfying certain pooling or separation properties and coverage rankings.
The ve regimes are listed in Table 1, and distinguished as to whether the
degree of separation of the low-risk types, measured as cLL   cLH , is larger
or smaller than the size of the lens formed by the indi¤erence curves of HL
and LH (`).
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Table 1. The ve equilibrium regimes.
Regim e Order
separation degree of
low-risk types: cLL cLH
pooling
of HL Range
a for x Comments
A 1 0 = cLL cLH<` with HH 1  LL< x  1 HL pooled with HHsince HH
H <1 LL
M 1 0 < cLL cLH<` with
HH if xHH
H
LH if x<HH
H
xBM (D)<x
<1 LL
Only for high D;
cLL=1
B 1 0 < cLL cLH=` with
HH if xHH
H
LH if x<HH
H
min f 1 LL
1+LL
; 1
1+2D
g<x
<min f1 LL;xBM (D)g
cLL= 1 for high D
C 1 0 <`< cLL cLH with HH, HL andLH at c=0
xCE(D)<x<
min f 1 LL
1+LL
; 1
1+2D
g cLL= 1 for high D
E 2 0 < cLL cLH<` with LL 0 < x < xCE(D) cLL=1 for high Dor low x
aThe functions xBM(D) and xCE(D) are dened below in the discussion of Fig.
8.
Note that Regime E distinguishes itself from the others in that Order
2 applies. Note also that full separation is never optimal. In the case of
Order 1, the rst part of Lemma (1) indicates that HL should be pooled
with either HH or LH. In the case of Order 2, the suboptimality of full
separation follows from the following Lemma (proven in the Appendix).
Lemma 2 (suboptimality of full separation under Order 2) Suppose that
HH is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for LH, but strictly
dislikes that for HL, and suppose that LH is indi¤erent between her own
contract and that for HL, but strictly dislikes that for LL, and suppose that
HL is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for LL. Then, prot
can be increased by pooling HL with either LL or LH.
In the companion paper, we prove the rst main result, stated below.
Proposition 1 The ve menu structures listed in Table 1 are potential so-
lutions to the monopolist problem. If   0, no other menu structures can
be optimal. In particular, full separation is never optimal.
We now give a characterization of each regime. In the next section, we
explain when it pays for the insurer to move from one regime to another.
 Regime A
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This regime pools the high-risk types at full insurance, and the low-risk
types at high, but partial, insurance. Figure 3 illustrates. (In this gure
and those that follow, solid/dashed indi¤erence curves refer to high/low risk
aversion, while bold/thin indi¤erence curves refer to high/low risks).
Figure 3 here
Denoting the co-insurance rate for the low-risk types as cAL, Regime A
is described by
cAL = minfD
H
1  H ; 1g; and c
A
HH = c
A
HL = 0:
This policy corresponds to one under which individuals di¤er only in their
risk dimensions (Theorem 2). Below, we argue thatRegime A is optimal if
x is su¢ ciently large (i.e., when heterogeneity in risk aversion is weak), more
specically when x  1   LL. Because a non-positive correlation ensures
that 1   LL > HHH , it follows from Lemma 1 that it is always optimal to
pool HL with HH in Regime A.
From now on, we restrict the type space T0 further by imposing an upper
bound DA on D,
DA
def
=
1  H
H
;
that is,
T1 = f(D; x) 2 T0 j D  DAg:
This restriction ensures that cAL < 1. In other words, it rules out exclusion
of the low-risk types when individuals are almost equally risk averse. This
condition ensures that our model encompasses the market situation described
by Stiglitz (1977).
Given that x  1  LL > H, it follows that when Regime A applies,
the pooling of the low-risk types happens at a lowco-insurance rate, viz.,
cAL < D
x
1 x(=


).
 Regime M
This regime gives full insurance toHH, insures LH at a small but positive
co-insurance rate, but excludes LL. TypeHL is pooled withHH if x > HH
H
;
otherwise, this type is pooled with LH (cf Lemma 1). Figure 4 (drawn for
x > HH
H
) illustrates this regime.
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Figure 4 here
Below, we show that x < 1   LL is a necessary condition for Regime
M to be optimal.
The optimal values for the co-insurance rates are given by
cMLL = 1; c
M
LH =

D Hx
H(1 x)+LHx if x >
HH
H
;
D Hx
HL+LH
if x  HH
H
;
cMHH = 0; and c
M
HL =

0 if x > HH
H
;
D Hx
HL+LH
if x  HH
H
:
Thus, the di¤erence between A and M is that the low-risk types (LH
and LL), are now separated from one another, but the degree of separation
is small, in the sense that cLL   cLH < `, the size of the lens.
 Regime B
In this regime, the two low-risk types are separated by positioning them
on each side of the lens. That is, they satisfy cLH+cLL  2 Dx1 x . We may dis-
tinguish between Regime Bf and Regime Bp, depending on whether LH
obtains full insurance (cLH = 0) or partial insurance (cLH > 0), respectively.
For the latter regime, we can also make a distinction based on whether LL
individuals are included (BpI: cLL < 1) or excluded (BpX: cLL = 1) from
insurance. Lemma 1 can be applied to determine whether HL should be
pooled with HH (x  HH
H
) or LH (x < HH
H
). The three panels of Figure
5 (drawn for x  HH
H
) illustrate.
Figure 5a, 5b, 5c here
Regime B may be summarized as follows:
cBHH = 0, c
B
LH =
8<:
2D x
1 x   1 (BpX),
D (1+LH+LL)x (1+LH LL)
(1 H)(1 x) (BpI),
0 (Bf),
(22)
cBHL =

0 if x > HH
H
;
cBLH if x  HHH :
and cBLL =
8<:
1 (BpX),
D 2LH+H(1 x)
(1 H)(1 x) (BpI),
2D x
1 x (Bf).
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 Regime C
Regime C is one under which everybody is fully insured, except for
the LL individuals who face a very high co-insurance rate (CI) or are even
excluded (CX). Moreover, the screening between LH and LL is now very
thorough in the sense that cLL   cLH > `. Consequently, cLL  2 . This
regime is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6 here
Regime C thus balances a high premium income from the uppertypes
with the loss in prot from distorting LLs contract. Intuitively, with few
LL individuals around, such distortion is attractive, and with hardly any of
them around, it is even optimal to exclude them altogether.
We can summarize Regime C as follows:
cCHH = c
C
HL = c
C
LL = 0; c
C
LL =

D 1 LL
LL
(CI),
1 (CX).
 Regime E
A common feature of all previous regimes is that Order 1 applies (cHL 
cLH). In Regime E, the opposite is true: HLs contract is now severely
distorted by being pooled with LL. This makes room for increasing the
distortion on LH, which, in turn, allows the insurer to extract more rent from
HH individuals. Again, if there are few low-risk-averse individuals around,
it may pay to exclude these individuals from the market (EX), otherwise
they are included but receive limited insurance (EI). Figure 7 illustrates.
Figure 7 here
Separation of LH from LL is once more minimal: cLL  cLH < `. Under
Order 1, separation of LL from LH is carried out to increase the prots from
HH, HL and LH at the cost of a lower prot from LL. Under Order 2,
HL is pooled with LL so as to extract more rent from the highly risk-averse
types, HH and LH. Across these two types, rent extraction is optimized in
the standard way (cf Theorem 2).
Denoting the common co-insurance rate forHL and LL as cL, the optimal
co-insurance rates for Regime E are
cEHH = 0; c
E
LH = D
HHx
LH
; and cEL =

D xHL
x H (EI),
1 (EX).
(23)
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This concludes the presentation of the ve regimes, or contract menus.
Loosely speaking, one can say that the degree of separation between LH
and LL, viz., cLL   cLH , increases as one moves from A (cLL   cLH = 0)
into M (0 < cLL   cLH < `), into B (0 < cLL   cLH = `), and further
into C (0 < ` < cLL   cLH). In Regime E, the degree of separation
becomes minor again, but E is qualitatively di¤erent because it makes use
of a di¤erent order.
6 Comparison of regimes
Having established the optimal co-insurance structure for each regime, we
now investigate for which (D; x) combinations each of the regimes becomes
optimal. The precise comparisons are relegated to the technical companion
paper. Here, we limit ourselves mainly to a graphical presentation by par-
titioning the (D; x) space into subspaces according to which regime secures
the monopolist the highest prot. We rst establish the optimal menu in
the neighbourhoods of the upper and lower boundaries for x. Thereafter,
we sketch the optimal menus for intermediate values of x.
When there is no heterogeneity in risk aversion, we know from Theorem
2 that Regime A is optimal. By a continuity argument, this is also true
for small di¤erences between H and L. Low-risk types will be partially
insured while high-risk types obtain full insurance.
Theorem 5 As x! 1, the optimal contract menu is dened by Regime A.
Inspection of (23) shows that for small enough x, it is optimal to exclude
the two types with low-risk aversion (HL and LL) in Regime E. For the
other regimes, one of the risk-tolerant types (i.e., HL) continues to buy
insurance. However, if x approaches zero, the willingness to pay for insurance
among highly risk-averse types (HH and LH) becomes innitely larger than
that among low-risk-averse types. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to keep
providing the latter with insurance, as this constrains the premia that can
be charged to the former.
Theorem 6 As x ! 0, the optimal contract menu is dened by Regime
EX.
Before we consider when the other regimes become optimal, note that
because Regimes A, M, B, and C all share the same order (Order 1),
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when moving from one regime into the adjacent one, at least one of the co-
insurance rates changes continuously. Regime E, on the other hand, makes
use of Order 2. The move from this regime into the adjacent one makes all
co-insurance rates jump (except for cHH , which is always zero). Identication
of the borderline of regime E is then only possible by comparing the maximal
prot functions. This is explained in more detail in our technical companion
paper.
We now explain in a heuristic way the optimal regimes for intermediate
x. For this purpose, suppose that x is close to unity to begin with; i.e., there
is initially hardly any di¤erence in risk aversion, but then x steadily falls in
value, which signies increased heterogeneity in risk aversion. With x close
to unity, the optimal menu is given by Regime A. The size of the lens is
` = 2
 
D x
1 x   cAL

= 2

D x
1 x  D 1 HH

. As x falls, H starts to exceed
L. This makes it optimal to start screening the LL from the LH types: by
providing LL with less coverage (at a lower premium), LH (and therefore
also the high-risk types HH and HL) can be charged a higher premium.
However, because LL was initially pooled with LH at the left-hand crossing,
a marginal increase in cLH is impossible for incentive compatibility reasons.
What is possible is to move LL from the left-hand crossing to the co-insurance
rate corresponding to the right-hand crossing, and adjusting her premium to
keep her rent at zero. This becomes optimal when x < 1   LL; then,
Regime BpI takes over. This is possible as long as the lens is not too big,
i.e., if cAL+` = 2D
x
1 x D 1 HH  1. However, whenD is large, the previous
reshu­ ing would involve a co-insurance rate for LL that exceeds unity (and
a negative premium). Because this is ruled out, the best the insurer can do
is to exclude LL and to extract all the rent from LH. This is what happens
in Regime M. It can be shown that in this regime, the right-hand crossing,
i.e., cMLH + `, is increasing in x. Hence, as x falls further, then at some stage,
this right-hand-side crossing will coincide with the no-insurance point (1; 0).
This happens when x falls short of xBM(D).12 At that point, Regime BpX
takes over from Regime M. See Figure 8.
Figure 8 here
When x falls far enough, it pays to increase the wedge between cLL and
cLH , even in excess of `. That is, the point at which Regime C takes over
12That is, xBM (D) solves 2 Dx1 x   cMLH = 1.
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from Regime B. In the companion paper, we show that
C > B () x < minf1  LL
1 + LL
;
1
1 + 2D
g;
where LL is given by (19).
When there is substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion (when x is very
small), it becomes protable to screen the highly risk averse as a group from
the low-risk-averse group. The only way to implement this is by switching
to Order 2. Then, Regime E is optimal. In the companion paper, we also
show that there exists a function, xCE(H; HH ; ;D), that is non-increasing
in D, with xCE(H; HH ; ;D) < 11+2D for any D 2 [0; DA], such that
E > C () x < xCE(H; HH ; ;D):
This function is found by comparing the maximal prot under Regime
C with the maximal prot under Regime E. Because there is continuity
when switching from B to C, whereas there is discontinuity when switching
from C to E, the question arising is whether C can be dominated by E
for any x that makes C dominate B. In other words, does it make more
sense to compare E with B? This is illustrated in Figure 9. The prot
function E intersects with C at bx < minf1 LL
1+LL
; 1
1+2D
g, while the functioneE dominates C , indicating that once x falls short of ex, Regime B should
be replaced by Regime E.
Figure 9 here
For each value of  ( 0), we can dene a region R() in the (H; HH)
space such that this is indeed what happens:
R() = f(H; HH) 2 [0; 1]2 : xCE(H; HH ; ;D)jsmall D  1  LL(H; HH ; )
1 + LL(H; HH ; )
g
Bundles in this region can be shown to be feasible.13 Figure 10ac displays
R() for  = 0;  1
30
;  2
30
. Thus, if  =   2
30
, then for almost all (H; HH)
that are feasible in combination with this value for  (the area delineated
by the dashed line), it transpires that the interval for which Regime C
is optimal, [xCE(H; HH ; ;D);minf1 LL(H;HH ;)1+LL(H;HH ;) ; 11+2Dg], is non-empty.
For    :089, almost allcan be replaced by any.
13That is, if (H; HH) 2 R() for some   0, then (H; HH ; ) 2 A1.
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Figure 10a, 10b, 10c here
We therefore restrict the set of distribution parameters further to
A2 = f(H; HH ; ) 2 A1 and (H; HH) =2 R()g:
However, from the previous discussion, A2 is almost as large as A1.
We now provide the second main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (H; HH ; ) 2 A2. Then, the optimal menu
structure as a mapping from T1 into the menu set is as illustrated in Figure
8.14
Recall that D measures the incentive for H-type individuals to mimic
L-type individuals, normalized by (twice) the risk premium of the latter.
A high co-insurance rate discourages the former group from applying for
the contracts intended for the latter, and thus allows insurers to charge the
former group more for full insurance. Regimes M, BX, CX, and EX all
exclude LL; they become optimal for high levels of D.
On the other hand, x measures the extent of similarity in risk aver-
sion. Dissimilarity warrants a contract menu that screens low-risk-averse
consumers from highly risk-averse ones. The latter group is much more
willing to pay for insurance coverage, and the monopolist takes advantage of
this. Such screening is absent in Regime A and maximal in Regime EX
, under which all risk-tolerant individuals are excluded from coverage. The
result is a market with only highly risk-averse customers, who have private
information on their expected losses. The standard screening problem thus
applies.
We conclude this section by plotting in Figure 11 the optimal co-insurance
rates for LL and LH underlying the di¤erent regimes (assuming that D <
(1 H)LL
LH+(1 H)(1 LL) such that Regime M can be ignored). The analysis of
Section 8 is based on this gure.
Figure 11 here
14As explained in the previous section, whether HL is pooled with HH or with LH
in Regimes Bp and M depends on whether x exceeds or falls short of HHH . Given
that H = HHH  

H
, with non-positive correlation, HHH will never exceed H(<
1+LH LL
1+LH+LL
). Figure 8 is based on H = :6; HH = :2 and  = 0. Hence, HHH = H ,
and all (D;x) combinations in the regions for BpX andM have pooling of HL with HH
rather than with LH.
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7 The positive correlation test
Chiappori et al. (2006) showed that a common prediction of any model of
a competitive insurance market with asymmetric information is a strictly
positive relationship between the degree of coverage and the expected loss
across contracts. This is quite a strong result, and we refer to it as positive
monotonicity (PM). This property implies a positive correlation between
coverage and risk, but the converse is not true.
In the empirical literature on testing for asymmetric information in in-
surance markets, researchers typically rely on estimating the correlation co-
e¢ cient between coverage and the expected loss, and then use a one-sided
test to determine whether this coe¢ cient is statistically signicantly positive
(see, e.g., Cohen and Siegelman, 2010; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). The
empirical evidence on positive correlation is somewhat weak; there is even
evidence of negative correlation in some markets.15 This is quite surprising,
because the result of Chiappori et al. (2006) is general; conditional on the
competition assumption, it holds for any combination of moral hazard and
adverse selection in underlying risk.16
As mentioned in the introduction, there are proposed theoretical explana-
tions for this lack of evidence. One is the so-called cherry picking argument
(Chiappori and Salanié, 2000) or propitious selection(Hemenway, 1990),
which combines adverse selection in risk preference (but not in the under-
lying risk) with moral hazard. The argument is that if individuals take
precautions having purchased insurance, then highly risk-averse individuals
15The later phenomenon is termed advantageous or propitious selection. In regard to
life insurance, see, e.g., Cawley and Philipson (1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2003),
and in long-term care, see, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). On the other hand,
Olivella and Vera (2011) show that in duplicate or substitutive private health insurance
systems (in which the public and (competitive) private insurance sectors o¤er the same
portfolio of services), if (but not only if) there is heterogeneity in risks only, then propitious
selection into private insurance should be observed if and only if information on risks is
symmetric.
16When the literature refers to moral hazard, this could encompass two distinct phe-
nomena. One relates to individuals who enjoy more coverage having less of an incentive to
undertake precautionary behaviour, which makes them observationally more risky. The
other arises because one does not necessarily observe actual risk but the usage of, say,
health services. Because coverage implies a lower cost of accessing these services, individ-
uals may use more of these services because they have more coverage, not because they
are more risky. Notice that both types of moral hazard reinforce the positive correlation.
Of course, one of the econometric issues is that, even after observing some positive corre-
lation, it is hard to disentangle the adverse selection and either of the two moral hazard
e¤ects.
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will increase their coverage as well as take more precautions, everything else
being equal. This may then result in a negative correlation between observed
risk and coverage.17
Because the optimal menu in a monopoly market with two-dimensional
screening may display Order 2, PM will cease to hold; for a subset of types
(LH and HL), coverage is negatively related to risk size. This of course does
not imply that the correlation between risk and coverage is negative, because
PM does hold for other subsets of types (between HH on the one hand and
LH and LL on the other). This also suggests that a su¢ ciently negative
correlation between risk and risk aversion (i.e., a su¢ ciently small ) ensures
a negative correlation between coverage and risk size. This is shown below.
In fairness, Chiappori et al. (2006) pointed out that in a monopoly, the
PM property may be violated. They do this by starting with a model
in which only preference heterogeneity exists (cf. Section 4), and then by
introducing an innitesimal amount of exogenous risk heterogeneity that is
perfectly negatively correlated with risk heterogeneity (i.e., the more risk-
averse agents have a slightly smaller accident probability). We show that
the PM property does not hold whenever Regime E applies, even if the
underlying risk and risk preference are independently distributed.
Translated into our setting, the Chiappori et al. (2006) proposition may
be stated as follows:
Consider two contracts Ca and Cb that are o¤ered on the market. Sup-
pose that: (i) Ca gives more coverage then Cb, i.e., ca < cb; and (ii) the
per capita prot generated by contract a does not exceed that of contract b,
(Ca)  (Cb). Then, (iii) the expected loss to those consumers signing up
for contract a should exceed the expected loss of those consumers signing up
for contract b, i.e., (Ca)  (Cb).
It is easy to see that property (iii) is satised in all regimes except for
Regime E. In that regime, the contract for LH has more coverage than the
contract for the low-risk-averse individuals (LL and HL). The PM property
would then require that (CLH) = L > (CL) =

HL
L
H +
LL
L
L

, which
is obviously violated. The culprit is the violation of condition (ii): CELH
generates a higher per capita prot than does CEL. This can be seen as
17See, e.g., Jullien et al. (2007), De Donder and Hindriks (2009), and Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006).
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follows:
(CEL) =
HL
L

1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L   (1  cEL)

+
LL
L
1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L
=
1
2
[1  (cEL)2]L  
HL
L
(1  cEL);
(CELH) =
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]H  
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]
=
1
2
[1  (cELH)2]L.
Because cELH < c
E
L, it follows that (CLH) > (CL), irrespective of which
optimal values the co-insurance rates take under Regime E.
Performing a positive correlation test on our model would amount to
calculating the covariance across contracts between 1   c(C) and (C), as
follows:
cov(1  c(Cij); (Cij)) =
X
i;j
ij(1  cij)i  
X
i;j
ij(1  cij)
X
i;j
iji:
As the second part of the following proposition shows, when the opti-
mal regime is EI, this covariance is negative only if the correlation between
expected loss and risk aversion, , is su¢ ciently negative.
Proposition 3 (i) For a su¢ cient degree of heterogeneity in risk aversion,
such that Regime E prevails, some low-risk individuals (LH) purchase more
coverage than do some high-risk individuals (HL). (ii) In the case ofRegime
EI, cov(1  c(Cij); (Cij)) < 0 if and only if  <  HH

x  HH
H

(< 0).
In other words, the advantageous selection among LH and HL, described
by part (i), may exactly o¤set the standard adverse selection, such that any
correlation between risk and coverage vanishes. Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) show that the long-term care insurance market may su¤er from asym-
metric information, despite the absence of evidence for a positive correlation
between risk and coverage. Our model helps in interpreting this evidence.
8 Gender discrimination
Crocker and Snow (1986) have shown that imperfect categorical discrimina-
tion in insurance such as gender discrimination always expands the e¢ -
ciency frontier. Hoy (1982) showed how categorization based on a signal
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may lead to a Pareto improvement in a competitive insurance market if the
signal conveys information about the level of risk. In this section, we ask
when such e¢ ciency gains arise in a monopolistic market structure. We
show that a Pareto improvement is possible if the signal, such as gender, is
informative about risk aversion.
Let us write p(; ; g) as the likelihood function that an arbitrary insuree
has an expected loss of , risk aversion of  and gender g 2 fm;wg. A
monopolist who is allowed to condition on gender will, for each gender, g,
design an optimal contract menu based on the risk-aversion ratio, x, the risk
di¤erence parameter, D, and the probability matrix,18
p(L; Ljg) p(L; H jg)
p(H ; Ljg) p(H ; H jg)

:
We now assume that risk aversion is a su¢ cient statistic for gender with
respect to the expected loss:
Condition S p(j; g) = p(j).
Condition S means that within a given risk-aversion class, the observation
of a persons gender carries no extra information about the risk class to which
this person belongs.19 In general, su¢ ciency is not enough to break the link
between gender and expected loss. If female drivers are highly risk averse,
and if this attitude leads them to careful driving, then there will still be
a connection between gender and expected loss. This last connection is
broken by the assumption that expected loss is independently distributed of
risk aversion i.e., risk aversion has no impact on driving. This allows us to
state the following result.
Lemma 3 If the likelihood function p() satises Condition S and if  and 
are independently distributed, then  and g are also independently distributed:
p(jg) = p().
Thus, these assumptions support the conclusion reached by the European
Commission that gender is insignicant in explaining risk type.
18We assume that the support of the distribution of types does not vary with the signal.
Alternatively, the support could be made dependent on the signal. This, in e¤ect, amounts
to assuming that the support consists of more than four (; )-pairs, some of which have
zero probability mass, depending on the observation of the signal.
19Two equivalent formulations of Condition S are: p(gj; ) = p(gj) and p(; jg) =
p(j)  p(jg).
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Because a gender-discriminating rm will use the probability functions
p(; jg) (g = m;w), rather than the single function p(; ), to design menus,
and because prots and consumer rents depend on the co-insurance rate cLL,
it is important to determine the e¤ect of p() on cLL. For this purpose,
let us assume that D < (1 H)LL
LH+(1 H)(1 LL) so that we can ignore Regime
M. From proposition 2, it follows that without discrimination, the upper
boundaries of regimes C, Bf, and BpI are determined by the parameters
LL and LH . Fixing x, L (and therefore H = 1   L) allows one to
trace out the optimal value of cLL as a function of LL. This yields Figure
12, in which it is assumed that 1 x
1+x
< 1
2
(1+L)(1 x). This means that the
curve for LLs optimal co-insurance rate is at for some range of LL values;
this is equivalent to assuming that
1  L
1 + L
< x: (24)
Figure 12 here
Let us dene !L (!H) as the likelihood that an arbitrary person with low
(high) risk aversion is a female; i.e., !L
def
= p(wjL) and !H def= p(wjH). If
half the population are women, then p(w) = !HH + !L(1  H) = 12 .
There is now ample evidence that men are on average less risk averse than
women.20 For our model, this means that p(Ljw) < p(L) < p(Ljm). An
insurance company that is allowed to gender discriminate, having observed
the customers gender g, will update the probability LL in the following
way:
LLjm
def
= p(L; Ljm) = p(LjL)  p(Ljm) = p(L)  p(Ljm) (< LL); and
LLjw
def
= p(L; Ljw) = p(LjL)  p(Ljw) = p(L)  p(Ljm) (> LL):
where the rst equality sign follows from Condition S and the second fol-
lows from independence. Thus, L and H do not change when gender is
observed.
Suppose now that (24) holds, and suppose that the proportion of LL
individuals as a whole, the proportion among men, and the proportion among
20See Hartog et al. (2002), Cohen and Einav (2007), Eckel and Grossman (2008),
Kimball et al. (2008) and Aarbu and Schroyen (2011).
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women, are LL; LLjm, and LLjw, respectively. Suppose also that these
proportions are as illustrated in Figure 13.
Figure 13 here
Then, we can conclude that because
1  x
1 + x
< LLjw < LL <
1
2
(1 + L)(1  x); (25)
the co-insurance rate for LL women will remain at its no-discrimination value,
and the rents of LH women, HL women, and HH women will not change
because of discrimination (and LL women continue to receive zero rent). On
the other hand, because
1  x
1 + x
< LL <
1
2
(1 + L)(1  x) < LLjm; (26)
the optimal co-insurance rate for LLmen will drop below its no-discrimination
value, and therefore, all men will receive more rent when o¤ered the optimal
contract menu for men (except LL men, who continue to receive zero rent).21
The insurance company will increase its total prots because of nding it op-
timal to choose a new menu for its male clientele it could have stuck to the
same menu as in the no-discrimination case. Thus, a Pareto improvement is
possible by allowing gender discrimination. As can be seen from the gure,
conditions (25) and (26) are not only su¢ cient for a Pareto improvement,
but also necessary. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Condition S holds, and that  and  are inde-
pendently distributed. Suppose that (24) holds. For given values of x; L,
and D, allowing gender discrimination will lead to a Pareto improvement in
the insurance market if and only if conditions (25) and (26) hold.
Condition (24) is satised when the proportion of low-risk individuals,
L, is not too small in relation to x.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is the following. Because men are on
average less risk averse, the malemarket consists of more LL types than
does the overall market. This makes the distortion of the LL contract that
21Because the optimal menu for men is of the type Bp, the rents are given as follows:
RHH = RHL +
1
2;RHL = RLL + (1   cLL), RLH = RLL+ 12 (1   c2LL), and
RLL = 0.
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was optimal for the entire market too costly for the malemarket: o¤ering
LL men a lower co-insurance rate (in return for a higher premium) increases
prots from this market segment su¢ ciently to compensate for the lower
rents extracted from the "higher" male types. Hence, all men benet, and
so does the monopolist.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the outcome in a monopolistic insurance market
when the insurer is only aware of the statistical distribution of the expected
loss and the level of risk aversion of its customers. We formulated a mean
variance model that results in quasilinear preferences over contracts; we iden-
tied the ve contract menus that emerge in equilibrium; and for each menu,
we derived the optimal co-insurance rates. Next, we identied for each menu
the subset of parameter values for which that menu is optimal. We did this
under non-positive correlation between the two characteristics.
We found:
 it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. In other words, there
will always be some pooling of types in equilibrium;
 the greater is the heterogeneity in the expected loss, the more it pays
to screen the low-risk from the high-risk types, by imposing a high
co-insurance rate on the former;
 the greater is the heterogeneity in terms of risk aversion, the more it
pays to screen the low-risk-averse from the highly risk-averse by impos-
ing a high co-insurance rate on the former; and
 the property of positive monotonicity between coverage and expected
loss need no longer hold neither does the property of positive corre-
lation.
We also identied an open set of parameter values such that when the fe-
male distribution of risk aversion rst order stochastically dominates the male
distribution, allowing gender discrimination results in a Pareto improvement
in this market. Hence, our analysis shows that one should be careful when
abolishing gender categorization; even when gender itself does not (statisti-
cally) a¤ect the expected level of losses or claims, it may a¤ect the outcome
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in an imperfectly competitive insurance market so that nobody gains and
some participants become worse o¤.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Suppose that full separation under Order 2 is optimal. This situation is
depicted in Figure 14.
Figure 14 here
First note that cLL must exceed


= D x
1 x because, otherwise, LH and
HL could not have been separated.
The prots from the di¤erent types are as follows.
HH =
1
2
(1  c2HH)H   (1  cLH)+ (1  cHL) 
1
2
(1  c2HL)   (1  cLL)
HL =
1
2
(1  c2HL)L   (1  cLL)
LH =
1
2
(1  c2LH)H + (1  cHL) 
1
2
(1  c2HL)   (1  cLL)
LL =
1
2
(1  c2LL)L
Weighting with the respective population proportions gives the following rst
derivatives with respect to the co-insurance rates.
@tot
@cHH
=  HHcHHH ; @tot
@cLH
= HH  LHHcLH ;
@tot
@cHL
=  H+ HcHL   HLcHLL;
@tot
@cLL
= (1  LL)  LLcLLL
The solution for cLL is cLL = minfD 1 LLLL ; 1g. A necessary condition that
cLL > D
x
1 x is x < 1  LL. Only if cLL > D x1 x is there room to separate
LH from HL. Because
@tot
@cHL
=  H+ [H(1  x)  HLx]HcHL;
total prot is strictly concave in cHL if and only if x  H1 LL . In that case,
the optimal solution for cHL is cHL = minfD HxH(1 x) HLx ; 1g.
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By monotonicity, the only possibility for full separation arises when cHL =
D Hx
H(1 x) HLx < 1. It remains then to check whether cHL < cLL. Suppose
rst that cLL = D 1 LLLL < 1. Then,
cHL < cLL () x < H(1  LL)
HLL + (1  LL)2 :
Because H(1 LL)
HLL+(1 LL)2 <
H
1 LL , this condition contradicts the assump-
tion that x  H
1 LL . Suppose next that cLL = 1. Then,
cHL < cLL () x < H
1  LL +DH :
Again, this contradicts the assumption that x  H
1 LL . Hence, cHL = cLL,
meaning that HL is pooled with LL.
On the other hand, if total prot is strictly convex in cHL, it pays to
move cHL either down to cLH or up to cLL. Hence, full separation is never
optimal. 
Proof of proposition 3, part (ii).
Under Regime EI, cEL = D
xHL
x H , with x > H = LH + HH . Using
the denition of LH , this condition on x is equivalent to x > HHH  

H
.
Therefore,
 >  H

x  HH
H

: (27)
In addition, because   0, a necessary condition on x is that
x >
HH
H
: (28)
Substituting the co-insurance rates into the covariance formula for the
expressions given by (23), and making use of the formulae for HL, LH and
LL ((17)-(19), enables one to write the covariance between coverage and
risk as
cov =
+ HH

x  HH
H

+ H

x  HH
H
 2H()2 xL .
Consider now Figure 9 in the main text. Let D be small enough for
Regime EI to prevail. Given (28), all the terms in the round brackets in
34
the above expression are positive. From (27), the denominator is positive.
Therefore,
cov < 0()  <  HH

x  HH
H

:

35
36 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  An indifference curve and an iso-profit line in the (c,P)-space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The indifference curves of HL and LH cross twice 
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Figure 3.  Regime A 
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Figure 4. Regime M 
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Figure 5a.  Regime BpI    Figure 5b.  RegimeBpX    Figure 5c.  Regime Bf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Regime C 
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Figure 7.  Regime E 
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Figure 8.  Optimal regimes in the (D,x)-space. xBM (D) and xCE(D) are explained in 
the text.  ?̅?𝐵𝑝(𝐷) is found by setting the expression for 𝑐𝐿𝐿𝐵  for Regime BpI (see eq 
(22)) equal to 1  
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Figure 9.  When profits of Regime E are given by 𝜋�𝐸 , Regime C is entirely dominated by 
Regime E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  For (αH⋅,αHH)-values inside the solid line area, Regime C ceases to occur when ρ 
equals 0 (a), -.0333 (b), -.0666 (c).  The dashed line area gives all combinations of (αH⋅,αHH) 
such that for the selected ρ the triplet (αH⋅,αHH,ρ) belongs to Ao.  
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Figure 11.  Optimal coinsurance rates for LH and LL as a function of x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  The optimal coinsurance rate for LL as a function of αLL   
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Figure 13.  A priori and updated probability of type LL and corresponding coinsurance rates   
 
 
 
Figure 14.  A full-separation menu under Order 2 
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